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JOE CAMEL EXPLAINS IT TO THE BOARD: CORPORATE LAW, WOMEN
IN THE WORKFORCE, AND THE EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN
THERESA A. GABALDON*
A USER’S GUIDE
The premise of this article is that corporate law, as it is currently
understood and allowed to operate, inevitably leads to the exploitation of
children as consumers.
The article acknowledges, deconstructs, and
reconstructs some of the common understandings about both parenting and
corporate function. In doing so, it employs feminist method, including the use
of storytelling and the invocation of experience in individual, anecdotal and
statistical terms. It also makes use of shifting voices, such as that of the
recurring Joe Camel, who will guide the reader and a fictional corporate board
through an understanding of the relationship between corporations and
underage consumers, providing an articulation of the considerations that have
motivated other boards in real life. Joe’s initial introduction to the board is
succeeded by a prologue describing a fictional scene set during the period in
which the stay-at-home mother perhaps was most idealized, but children’s
consumption preferences nonetheless were being felt. This is followed by a
formal introduction.
INTRODUCING JOE
Having lost his job as spokesperson for Reynolds Tobacco,1 Joe Camel
has traded in his bomber jacket for pin-stripes. [Readers now should
imagine a cartoon camel in a suit.] Meet Joe Camel, corporate consultant.
Joe speaks:
Gentlemen and lady [with nod toward token woman],2 thank you for
inviting me to address the board. My subject is why, today, there are

* Professor of Law and Carville Dickinson Benson Research Professor of Law, George
Washington University. B.S. 1975, University of Arizona; J.D. 1978, Harvard University. The author
gratefully acknowledges the inspiration of William T. Palmer and the efforts and insights of Robert
L. Palmer.
1. “Old Joe” was retired as part of the settlement in Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 875
P.2d 73 (Cal. 1994).
2. See Lynne L. Dallas, The New Managerialism and Diversity on Corporate Boards of Directors, 76
TUL. L. REV. 1363 (2002) (describing relative scarcity of women on the boards of publicly held
corporations, but relating increased representation of women, minorities, and non-nationals on
corporate boards to new managerial attitudes); cf. David A. Carter et al., Corporate Governance, Board
Diversity and Firm Value, 38 FIN. REV. 33, 50-51 (2003) (describing increases in firm value correlating
with increased board diversity); Thomas W. Joo, A Trip Through the Maze of “Corporate Democracy”:
Shareholder Voice and Management Composition, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 735, 739-40 (2003) (discussing
general benefits of increasing diversity); Steven A. Ramirez, Diversity and the Board Room, 6 STAN. J.L.
BUS. & FIN. 85 (2002) (discussing matters related to limited but possibly increasing diversity).
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opportunities to maximize shareholder value in ways unlike any in history. By
way of introduction, a few words sum it up. Busy moms, contributing to
production of new products. New ways to reach kids and new research
showing how to keep ‘em hooked. I like to call it “creating a need and filling
it” or “the free market never fails!” [More from Joe later.]
PROLOGUE
Oakdale, 1960
Autumn had embraced Oakdale early that year. A sapphire sky framed
crimson and ochre leaves, providing a classic backdrop for the pilgrimage back
to school. Students large and small drifted through the streets, fully outfitted
with the tools of their unchosen trade: new footgear, new clothing, new pencils,
and, for the younger set, new crayons and new lunch boxes. In the latter regard,
girls largely endorsed Barbie or Cinderella, but young gentlemen had more to
sort out. Darby Wallace’s choice of Daniel Boone trailed him on a plastic strap
as he traipsed toward Burkett Elementary, considering what was to come.
Burkett was the newer of the town’s two grade schools. The other, Oakdale
Elementary, was a red-brick toaster on what passed, by village standards, for a
busy street. Burkett, however, settled its several one-story arms across a verdant
expanse with a good-sized copse of trees. Darby eagerly anticipated a
rendezvous under arboreal cover with his best friend, Michael Levy, just as soon
as the bell pealed three. Michael was a passionate aficionado of Davy Crockett,
and most certainly would insist on his favorite game of “Alamo,” a revisionist
3
version in which Davy, handily assisted by Daniel Boone, always won. Sideby-side or back-to-back, the comrades would slash at the cunning “Messicans,”
represented by the highest clumps of undergrowth, until subjugation was
complete. Darby wished, for a moment, that his mother had not prevented him
(forcefully, after tactful persuasion had failed) from bringing along his birthday
pocket-knife, which surely would have impressed both Michael and the
Messicans.
Enough was novel about the school day itself, however, to distract Darby
from any regrets. First, of course, was the New Teacher, although the fact of the
matter was that Mrs. Smith had taught Darby’s two older brothers and thus was
well-known to the entire Wallace household. Then, there was the matter of the
New Desk. Yes, indeed, for the first time since he had commenced his academic
career, Darby was the initial occupant of a fresh-from-the-factory desk. The
desk was of the new style: rather than placing his personal effects in a metal bin
with a wooden lift-up top underladen with gum and thoroughly scarred with
someone else’s initials, he put his books and other paraphernalia in an open box
built-in sideways under his seat. This new desk model afforded on a regular
basis, the opportunity to hang upside down and observe the world from a new

3. See generally Rachel Borup, Bankers in Buckskins: Caroline Kirkland’s Critique of Frontier
Masculinity: Critical Essay, 18 AM. TRANSCENDENTAL QUARTERLY 229 (2004) (discussing, among other
things, the legends of Davy Crockett, Daniel Boone, and the Alamo); S. Derrickson Morre, As Kids,
We All Had a Gun and a Rope and a Hatful of Hope, LAS CRUCES SUN-NEWS, Oct. 16, 2005, at 1A
(discussing popularity in 1950s of Davy Crockett and Daniel Boone).
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vantage point, and Darby availed himself of this opportunity frequently
throughout the day.
Darby thus was occupied as the New Boy entered the classroom. The New
Boy was ushered in mid-day and introduced to the class. His name was Alan,
and each and every one of the other boys noted with relief that the New Boy
was small and that he looked like them. From upside down, salt n’ pepper
corduroy legs gave way to red-plaid flannel torso; a Lone Ranger lunch pail
swung to the side, successfully completing and complementing the ensemble.
Alan assumed his designated seat with an odd combination of diffidence and
swagger. Mrs. Smith, perhaps, was able to detect the tutelage of an elder in the
way he carried himself; in any event, its effect upon the boys in the class was as
desired. They saw neither David nor Goliath, neither patsy nor foe.
I. INTRODUCTION
Stating the Issue
Speaking, for the moment, in sweeping and un-footnoted generalities, it
has always been important to children to “fit in.” As Darby’s story is meant to
suggest, this has been true in America, notwithstanding some limited exaltation
of “standing out” associated with idealization of rugged individualism and
frontier spirit. Popular reportage would lead one to believe that the pressure to
fit in is even stronger in many other countries.
Sweeping generalities point also to the ready conclusion that, at least in
America, the nuclear family has played a critical role in introducing children to
the ways of the larger community. The family has served, in addition, as a
counterweight to certain forms of juvenile peer pressure. Few in number may
be the members of the reading audience who actually have achieved their adult
height without having heard from a parent, “If [fill in the name of your best
friend in high school] jumped off a bridge, would you do it too?”
The predictable next step in this line of thinking is a lament for the modern
decline in the ability of the nuclear family to fulfill the roles just described. The
decline, of course, often is characterized as a consequence of the women’s
4
liberation movement. The argument is as follows. When mothers went to work
5
in large numbers, they inescapably had less time to attend to concerns
6
associated with hearth and home. When mothers began to see no need to
7
legally cement their own relationships with the fathers of their children, the
8
father-child bonds too became less stable. Alienated fathers and overworked
9
mothers turned to the television for babysitting and . . . bingo, the children were

4. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
6. See generally Lynn Doan, Girl Power, VISALIA TIMES-DELTA, May 21, 2005, at 5A (commenting
on reduction in women’s time at home).
7. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
8. See generally Glenn Sachs, Are Boys Better Off Without Fathers?, THE SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER Sept. 6, 2005, at B7 (acknowledging the effect of absentee fathers); Kyuong M. Song,
Marriage as Learned Behavior: Can Divorce be Foretold?, SEATTLE TIMES, Jul. 27, 2005, at F1 (commenting
on disruption of familial bonds).
9. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
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body-snatched by programmers and advertisers. The rest is history, a history
accelerated by today’s video games and internet access.
On a superficial level, the logic suffices. No amount of hypothetical
rebuttals—”But why should it be the woman’s job to take care of the children?,”
or “Why should women be blamed for the decline in family stability?”—can
make this superficial logic disappear. Nor does “But studies show that highquality day care and/or some amount of television can be good for children”
suffice. Logic is logic, and neither day care nor television addresses the issue of
whether the nuclear family is available to acculturate and guide. That some
amount of day care or television can have value merely suggests that they are
palatable substitutes for familial guidance that might be consciously selected by
responsible parents.
The next anticipated logical assault comes from the ilk of, “But working
women have higher self-esteem and therefore can be better mothers.” Strictly
speaking, this argument only works if women with high self-esteem come home
and effectively communicate their values to their children. This logical inroad,
however, is somewhat refuted by experience, which shows us that what women
with high self-esteem actually do is come home from work and let their children
watch television, play video games, and surf the internet (all activities,
incidentally, that were not widely available to the young children when Darby
Wallace roamed the schoolyard and Donna Reed held sway).
Taking a step back, however, the decline in the effectiveness of nuclear
families in communicating values is cause for lament only if the consequences
themselves are lamentable. In other words, if children still manage to acquire
socially beneficial values, where’s the beef? The fact of the matter is, no one
really can tell whether the beef is even missing, since debate about which values
are socially beneficial generally precludes any empirical conclusions as to how
these values are or are not acquired. Although there may be modest consensus
that resort to violence—which we vaguely, if incorrectly, suspect of
10
increasing —is a social wrong, agreement about the social contribution of even
such traditional values as monotheistic belief is not readily forthcoming.
In other words, we cannot collectively know exactly what our values are, or
precisely where, or even if, our children are now acquiring them. We do know a
great deal, however, about what else children are acquiring, and that is “stuff.”
11
A ton of stuff. A ton of very expensive stuff. A ton of very expensive stuff that
has to be replaced very quickly as a result of changes in fancy and planned
obsolescence.
At the other end of the snake, more stuff is being produced, in part,
because our economy is more productive than ever before, both owing to
12
technology and to the entry of women into the work force. More marketing
takes place because technology has coughed up more ways to do it and,
perhaps, also because of shifting values. More marketing to children takes place
because it seems to work—a proposition that is essentially self-proven by the
above-referenced phenomenon of children’s burgeoning acquisition of stuff,
10.
11.
12.

See Chasing the Dream, ECONOMIST, Aug. 4, 2005, at 53, 54.
See infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
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coupled with an exploding amount of resources devoted to marketing to
13
children.
The choices—or non-choices—children make in the course of their
purchasing frenzy are the focus of this article, which utilizes feminist method to
examine the interaction of child-driven markets (defined as markets in which
consumption is influenced, in whole or in part, by the desires of children) and
corporate law. It is the author’s position that corporate law, as currently
understood and allowed to operate in an early twenty-first century context,
inevitably leads to exploitation of children’s desires. This point is made and
reiterated in the voice of Joe Camel “explaining” to the board what they almost
certainly already know, but probably paid him, as an independent consultant, to
justify. The case for the proposition is buttressed as follows. Part II-A provides
background on the effect of the women’s liberation movement on economic
development (including increased productivity and technology), family life, and
analytic methodology. It introduces and employs feminist method in setting the
stage for the conclusion that women’s presence in the workforce has
contributed, in complex ways, to corporate opportunism vis-à-vis children as
consumers.
Part II-B addresses corporate law, explaining its insistent
privileging of shareholder interests and describing its abstract justifying
assumptions about marketplace rationality. This analysis sheds light on the
propensity of corporate decision-makers to avoid contemplation of the effects
they may have on the quality of children’s lives. Part II-C describes the
burgeoning phenomenon of consumption by children, as well as detailing some
of its consequences. Part III integrates the disparate discussions of Part II,
explaining how feminist analysis of women’s experience and corporate form
and function leads to the conclusion that corporate America is engaging in the
effective rape and pillage of the pocketbooks and, more importantly, the psyches
of American children. Part IV proposes partial solutions.
Notwithstanding any “but-for” correlations (or lack thereof), it is no doubt
objectionable and offensive to place any part of the exploitation of American
children at the door of working women. Nonetheless, there is something
sullying working women’s collective door mats, and that something is the
14
experience of guilt, whether irrational or not. Catholic guilt, Jewish guilt, name
your ethnicity guilt are mere nothings compared to working-mother guilt. This
article concludes by taking the only half-frivolous position that working women
might confront and attempt to alleviate their feelings of guilt by implementing
15
at least some of the suggestions advanced.
And now for a word from Joe:
I’m sure, gentlemen and lady, being who you are,16 that you already get
my drift. Like any good speaker, I’ve told you what I’m going to tell you.

13. See infra notes 84, 87 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
15. See infra Part V.
16. Studies indicate that persons rising to the level of the board of publicly held corporations
are likely to express fairly uniform values, notwithstanding facial attempts at diversity. See infra
note 160 and accompanying text.

09_GABALDON.DOC

4/28/2006 8:57 AM

208 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

Volume 13:203

2006

Now, I’ll tell you what I’m telling you, before I tell you what I told you.
Here’s the important part of what I’m saying: It’s your duty to make money
for your shareholders. You do this by filling consumers’ needs, which they
express by paying for what you provide. As long as they keep paying, it
proves that the system is working. Are we all on the same page here or
what?
II. BACKGROUND: THE WOMEN’S MOVEMENT,
SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY, AND CHILD-DRIVEN MARKETS
Thus far, this article has suggested that the women’s movement has
interacted with the widely acknowledged corporate valuing of shareholder
primacy in such a way as to permit—and even to demand —the exploitation of
child-driven markets. Before persuading the reader that the linkage is as
suggested and that it is problematic, particularly for women, a bit more
explanation is required.
A. The Women’s Movement: Changing Demographics and Changing Analysis
Even those who vehemently deny evolution probably will admit that the
position of women in society has undergone dramatic change within the last few
decades. The only dispute is whether the change has been a desirable one. This
article seeks to avoid that question. It does, however, briefly illustrate the
change by reference to the author’s family history, as well as document it by
reference to demographic trends. It then describes some of the analytical tools
introduced by feminism, which served as the catalyst for this dramatic social
change. Part III uses those tools to demonstrate that the change itself
retrospectively may be characterized as one of the elements in this “perfect
storm” resulting in the wholesale exploitation of American children.
1. Changing Demographics
a. One Family’s Story
Inez Chavez Gabaldon
1879–1963
My grandmother, Grandma Inez, had fifteen children and never worked
“outside the home”—or, at any rate, never received wages for her labor on the
family’s subsistence farm. Upon the death of her husband at age forty-eight, she
became an entrepreneur of sorts, sending her two youngest sons door-to-door to
sell her cheese. She did not speak English, had no formal schooling, and did not
own a television until she was eighty-years-old.
Jacqueline Sykes Gabaldon
1930–1971
My mother married in college, but earned both her B.A. and M.A. while
caring for my sister and me. The family television received four channels, and
we were regular viewers of Romper Room, which was broadcast only three days a
week but nonetheless was a boon of time while Mom did her homework and
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housework. She taught us to read, and our devotion to that activity provided
her with even more time. My grandmother cared for us while my mother was
in class; Mom took us with her to do her student teaching. The year I, her
youngest, started kindergarten, she entered the traditional work force as a
teacher. She thereafter happily relinquished the lion’s share of her salary to pay
a five-day-a-week housekeeper to do the cleaning and laundry and to watch us
during the one-hour gap between our arrival at home and hers.
The Author
1954–
I went to college, on to law school, and into law practice. If I had stayed in
practice, I might have had children, but I don’t know how. (Well, yes, I know
how, it’s really the when that I’m quibbling about.) In any event, I became a
partner, went into teaching, got married, got tenure, had a child during a
sabbatical, and put him into day care when he was six months old. He is now
twelve years old, and because of all I had read before he was born, he has never
watched more than an hour of television a week (do not tell his friends).
Movies, however, are something else, and he uses the internet (sometimes at the
behest of his school), and then there are the video games . . . but I am getting
ahead of the story.
The Point
We all are familiar with idealized accounts of earlier social conditions in
which the spheres of home and work were separated and the former was
17
allocated to dedicated domestic goddesses. These accounts come closest to
reflecting a possible reality during the brief period between the Industrial
18
Revolution and the Technology Revolution. Even when these accounts are
confined to this temporally plausible context, however, they necessarily fail to
reflect the stories of many women’s real lives. Readers rummaging through
their own closets of recollection may, before moving on, be interested in testing
their own recent family histories against popular mythology.
b. A Numbers Story
Relevant facts about the changing lives of American women could fill
volumes, and individually are quite interesting. More important for purposes of
this article, they provide an impressionistic rendering that well may be the

17. See generally Stephanie Coontz, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES AND THE
NOSTALGIA TRAP (1992); Nancy F. Cott, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD 70 (2d ed. 1997); Theresa A.
Gabaldon, The Lemonade Stand: Feminist and other Reflections on the Limited Liability of Corporate
Shareholders, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1387, 1428-29 (1992) [hereinafter Gabaldon, Lemonade Stand]; Dorothy
E. Smith, Women, the Family and Corporate Capitalism, in WOMEN IN CANADA 17 (Marylee Stephenson
ed., 1977).
18. See Marlene O’Connor-Felman, American Corporate Governance and Children: Investing in Our
Future Human Capital in Turbulent Times, 77 S.C. L. REV. 1258, 1277-89 (2004) [hereinafter O’ConnorFelman, Human Capital]; see also Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Reframing the Debate about the
Socialization of Children: An Environmentalist Paradigm, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 85, 113-14 (2004)
(describing effect of industrialization on “sacralization” of childhood and characterizing childhood
as a cultural construct).
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source of our perception of the decline and fall of the American family. The
following facts are provided to document critical differences in the lives of
American women between the middle and the end of the twentieth century.
This documentation provides a basis for concluding, among other things, that
parental time and energy for the supervision of children has declined.
Fact: In the middle of the twentieth century, approximately one-third of
American women worked outside the home (loosely meaning “got paid in
19
20
money for what they did”). By 2004, over two-thirds did so.
Fact: For women with small children, the shift was an even more dramatic rise
21
from less than twenty percent to approximately sixty percent.
Fact: An increase in the work force attributable to the entry of women is
correlated chronologically with an increase in productivity in the American
22
economy.
Fact: On average, Americans work more hours today than they did before the
23
Industrial Revolution.
Fact: Over half of American households now believe they cannot afford the
24
things they really need.
Fact: Half of American marriages end in divorce; sixty percent of American
25
divorces involve children.
Fact: One out of three American children is born out of wedlock (up from one
26
out of thirteen in the 1960s).
27

Fact: Almost a quarter of American households are headed by single women.

19. Ronald Rindfuss et al., Women, Work and Children: Behavior and Attitudinal Change in the
United States, 22 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 457, 461 (1996).
20. Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Characteristics of Families (2005),
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/famee.toc.htm.
21. Id.; see also Teresa Arendell, Mothering and Motherhood: A Decade Review 13 (Ctr. for Working
Families, Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, Working Paper No. 3, 1990).
22. Mona L. Hymel, Consumerism, Advertising, and the Role of Tax Policy, 20 VA. TAX REV. 347,
380-90 (2000); see also MARTIN CARNOY, SUSTAINING THE NEW ECONOMY: WORK, FAMILY AND
COMMUNITY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 111 (2000) (asserting that women’s movement preceded rise
of the “new economy”).
23. Hymel, supra note 22, at 392.
24. Id. at 387.
25. Arendell, Mothering and Motherhood, supra note 21, at 10.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 12. It is estimated that sixty percent of American children will spend time in a singleparent household. Anita Garey & Terry Arendell, Children, Work, and Family: Some Thoughts on
Mother Blame 15 (Ctr. for Working Families, Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, Working Paper No. 4, 1999).
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Fact: Mothers work fewer hours outside the home than do other workers;
however, they earn substantially less, bringing home approximately sixty
29
percent of what other workers receive.
Fact: Notwithstanding employment outside the home, women spend
30
significantly more time on childcare and housework than do men.
31

Fact: Working mothers are sleep-deprived and time-crunched.

Fact: Working mothers feel guilty about not spending more time at work and
32
feel guilty about not spending more time with their children.

c. New Tools
Sometime during the earliest days of the late twentieth century evolution in
women’s lives, something changed about the way a significant number of them
33
thought about those lives.
It is arguable, in fact, that this change in
perspective—generally referred to as “feminism”—was a condition precedent
34
for the momentum of the demographic shift described above. To the extent
that the popularization of feminist thinking and deliberate demographic shifts
indeed can be linked, they are collectively referred to in this article as the
35
“women’s liberation movement.”
All of the many manifestations of feminism share a root concern with
identifying the various causes of women’s subordinate position in a patriarchal
36
society, as well as a common goal of ending that subordination. Inequality

28. Jane Waldfogel, The Effects of Children on Women’s Wages, 62 AM. SOC. REV. 209 (1997).
29. Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers Who
Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 78 (2003).
30. Linda R. Hirshman, Homeward BOUND, AM. PROSPECT, Dec. 2005, at 20; ARLIE HOCHSCHILD
& ANNE MACHENY, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME 271-79
(1989); see generally RHONDA MAHONY, KIDDING OURSELVES: BREADWINNING, BABIES, AND
BARGAINING POWER (1995) (describing domestic allocations of labor); cf. Arlie Hochschild, Who Cares
for the Elderly?, LA TIMES, Dec. 10, 2005, at B21 (describing similar phenomenon in context of
eldercare).
31. Phyllis Moen & Stephen Sweet, The New Workforce, the New Economy and the Lock-Step Life
Course: An American Dilemma 3 (Cornell Univ., Coll. of Human Ecology, Working Paper No. 02-21,
2002); Juliet Schor, Time Crunch Among American Parents, in TAKING PARENTING PUBLIC: THE CASE
FOR A NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENT 83 (Sylvia Ann Hewlett et al. eds., 2002).
32. As testimony to the ubiquity of this phenomenon, a Lexis-Nexis search in the “News, All”
database, using the search term “working mother” appearing within three words of “guilt”
produced 646 results. See also O’Connor-Felman, Human Capital, supra note 18, at 1309-10 (discussing
guilt and exhaustion).
33. See O’Connor-Felman, Human Capital, supra note 18, at 1287 (crediting BETTY FRIEDAN, THE
FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963) with initiation of the movement).
34. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
35. This is a term also encompassing, in popular usage, various forms of political and other
activism directed toward improving the position of women in society.
36. Linda J. Lacey, Introducing Feminist Jurisprudence: An Analysis of Oklahoma=s Seduction
Statute, 25 TULSA L.J. 775, 780 (1990); Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV.
617, 617-18 (1990); see also Deborah L. Rhode, Gender and Jurisprudence: An Agenda for Research, 56 U.
CIN. L. REV., 521, 523 (1987).
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37

lurks, of course, behind overtly discriminatory laws, but also is imposed, more
subtly, through legal and social regimes based on principles that are not
38
endorsed by those excluded from power. Feminists seek to reveal both (1) that
these principles are inherent in a variety of fields, including various fields of
39
law, and (2) what the consequences of these principles are. As a core part of
this endeavor, feminists examine women’s actual experiences, explore women’s
values, and assess the existing legal and social structures in terms of their
congruence with those experiences and values. This type of analysis does not
demand the assumption that the experiences and values of women diverge
significantly from those of men, but it is driven by the possibility that such a
40
divergence may exist.
As an integral part of their analytical process, feminist scholars make use of
the concept of “gender,” which is defined as the socially constructed, as opposed
41
to biological, differences between being male and female.
The term
“gendered” sometimes is used to describe structures, analyses, etc., that are the
outcome of gender. It may, for example, be said that corporate law is gendered
because it predominantly is the product of men, constructed in, perhaps
42
unknowing, reliance on their own experience of being male in society. As the
following section reveals, the landscape of corporate law indeed is characterized
by such socially-ascribed male characteristics as competitiveness, paternalism,
and formal rationality.

37. See generally Alan Blanco, Comment, Fetal Protection Programs under Title VII—Rebutting the
Procreation Presumption, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 755 (1985).
38. See Gabaldon, Lemonade Stand, supra note 17, at 1389.
39. Id. at 1418.
40. One difficulty faced by any feminist analysis is attempting to articulate the values manifest
in the experience of women; this is known as “essentializing.” Theresa A. Gabaldon, Feminism,
Fairness, and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate and Securities Law, 5 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 1, 4 (1995)
[hereinafter Gabaldon, Feminism, Fairness, and Fiduciary Duty] (arguing that one feminist task is to
articulate the values manifest in the experience of women, and to assess various existing legal and
social structures for fit with these values). To focus on the values of women presupposes that those
values will be common, and it tempts the analyst to assume that her own experience is an
appropriate surrogate for the experience of all. Id. Critical race theorists usefully have identified
this issue and illustrated its existence. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist
Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 603 (1990) (contending the theory that some women’s experience
as mothers should be asserted for all women is questionable); Marlee Kline, Race, Racism and Feminist
Legal Theory, 12 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 115 (1989). Accepting the lesson of essentialism does, however,
complement and refine the assertion that subjugation can come in different shapes and sizes. Thus,
if the values of even some women identifiably diverge from those underlying a legal regime, it is a
matter with which to be reckoned.
41. See, e.g., Mary Ann Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate
Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1 (1995) (giving a general discussion of
“gendering”). For example, between the Industrial Revolution and the advent of the women’s
liberation movement, the popularly ascribed gender role of women was to remain at home, raising
children (although, most certainly, some women, either as a matter of aspiration or necessity, did
deviate). That gender role has now been questioned and has shifted for some segments of society.
42. See Theresa A. Gabaldon, Corporate Conscience and the White Man’s Burden, 71 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 944, 945 (2002) (discussing outsider suspicion of the “white man” in shaping corporations,
corporate law, and corporate law commentary).
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B. Corporate Law and Shareholder Primacy
1. Corporate Stories
The stories of corporations and corporate law are as many and varied as the
life stories of women. No matter the point one wishes to make, a story can be
invoked. The stories that follow were specifically chosen, of course, to illustrate
that corporate profit-seeking behavior deliberately seeks influence in childdriven markets.
Joe Camel
Once upon a time, a corporation in search of profit manufactured
cigarettes. Men in charge learned that the corporation’s products were
addictive, which was good for the corporation and could be—and was—made
43
even better by tinkering with the mix. Unfortunately for the corporation, even
44
addicted consumers had alternate sources of cigarettes, so the company sought
to build brand loyalty using a cartoon camel that was, for a time, as familiar to
45
children as Mickey Mouse. The men in charge cannot have overlooked the fact
that the camel—let’s call him Joe—drew the attention of those who one day
became addicted juvenile smokers, “branded,” by reason of their attraction to
46
Joe, for what these men in charge hoped would be their entire lives.
Michael Jordan
Once upon a time, a corporation in search of profit manufactured sneakers.
Men in charge observed that children were insecure and impressionable and
sought to be like their heroes. Paying a sports hero—like Michael Jordan—to
wear the corporation’s sneakers brought handsome returns, as underage
consumers paid astounding premiums for footgear that cost relatively little to
47
make. Very few of these consumers became basketball stars, but some of them
48
were killed for their sneakers, and many more had them stolen.

43. See generally State v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. C1-94-8565, 1998 WL 134813 (Minn. Dist. Ct.,
Mar. 26, 1998).
44. See J. Howard Beales, III, Advertising to Kids and the FTC: A Regulatory Retrospective that
Advises the Present, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 873, 891-892 (2004) (describing competition).
45. Paul Fischer et al., Brand Logo Recognition by Children Aged 3 to 6 Years: Mickey Mouse and Old
Joe the Camel, 3 JAMA 3145, 3147 (1991).
46. See, e.g., Hymel, supra note 22, at 418; Michael A. McCann, Economic Efficiently and Consumer
Choice in Nutritional Labeling, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1161, 1182 (2004) (discussing the “branding”
phenomenon generally).
47. For a discussion of the allegations that Nike employed third-world child-labor under
sweatshop conditions, as well as Nike’s later efforts to rehabilitate its image, see Meg Carter, Ethical
Business Practices Come into Fashion, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Apr. 19, 2005, at 14.
48. Cf., e.g., Avram Goldstein, Police Seek Witnesses, Suspect in Slaying, WASH. POST, Jan 25, 1998,
at B03 (describing a killing for a jacket); Hymel, supra note 22, at 390 (commenting on effect of
jealousy over clothing); Troy Y. Nelson, If Clothes Make the Person, Do Uniforms Make the Student?
Constitutional Free Speech Rights and Student Uniforms in Public Schools, 118 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 3-4 (1997)
(same, and including allusions to predictable violence).
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Doom
Once upon a time, a corporation in search of profit manufactured video
games. Men in charge learned that children become addicted to violence in their
50
entertainment, even as they become desensitized to it. Increasing the violence
of the games seemed the logical solution. Corporate logic also dictated, of
course, that the new, more violent games—like Doom, which is based on a video
exercise used by the Marines to desensitize recruits to the taking of human life—
still be marketed to children. Seventy percent of video games rated “M” for
“mature audiences” are currently marketed to children under the age of
51
seventeen.
The Point
The not-so-subtle point is that corporations make no attempt to integrate
52
parental judgments in their own decision making. They are in business to
make money, not to watch out for the best interests of children, psychic or
otherwise. The argument that corporations do not act in loco parentis is further
substantiated by the proliferation of sugary cereals and other junk food, as well
53
as by the deluge of advertising marketing them to children.
2. Official Stories
A great deal—in fact, way too much—has been written and said on the
54
subject of corporate purpose.
The debate about corporate purpose largely
55
revolves around whose interests corporate directors primarily should serve.
Decades of interest in the subject have produced two fairly mainstream
approaches, set out below in order both of chronology and general acceptance.
a. The Contractarians: The Givens and the Goals of Shareholder
Primacy
One school of thought describes the corporation as a “nexus of contracts”
among capital providers, managers, employees, and others, all of whom conduct

49. Doom is a “point and shoot” video game, more fully described in Scott Whittier, School
Shootings: Are Video Game Manufacturers Doomed to Tort Liability?, 17 ENT. & SPORTS LAW 11 (2000).
50. See Tara C. Campbell, Comment, Did Video Games Train the School Shooters to Kill?:
Determining Whether Wisconsin Courts Should Impose Negligence or Strict Liability in a Lawsuit Against
the Video Game Manufacturers, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 811, 819-22 (2001) [hereinafter Campbell, School
Shooters].
51. Id. at 818 (citing CNN Talkback Live: Is Hollywood Marketing Sex and Violence to our Kids? (CNN
television broadcast, Sept. 14, 2000)); Woodhouse, supra note 18, at 117.
52. Cf. Angela J. Campbell, Ads2Kids.com: Should Government Regulate Advertising to Children on
the World Wide Web?, 33 GONZ. L. REV. 311, 341-43 (1997-1998) [hereinafter Campbell, Ads2Kids]
(developing argument for skepticism about corporation’s self-imposed efforts in this regard);
Woodhouse, supra note 18, at 115 (describing failure of voluntary controls by corporate providers of
video games, films and CDs).
53. See generally Beales, supra note 44, at 834-78 (describing advertising of fast food); McCann,
supra note 46, at 1181-82 (same).
54. Steven M.H. Wallman, Understanding the Purpose of a Corporation: An Introduction, 24 J. CORP.
L. 807-09 (1999) (reflecting on corporate purpose).
55. Id. at 809-11.
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56

themselves in a manner that is rationally self-interested. Adherents to this
school, sometimes known as “contractarians,” characterize the “best,” or “most
efficient,” corporate law as providing the “best,” or “most efficient” set of
57
default contract rules. These are the rules that contractarians have determined
the parties would negotiate for themselves most frequently, but which still may
58
be negotiated around at the parties’ behest.
The rules generally endorsed by contractarians reflect the assumption that
59
managers are agents for shareholders. Limiting the duties of the board of
directors to serving shareholder interests is considered the single best method of
limiting managerial opportunism and shirking, owing to the relative efficiency
60
of monitoring by a single class of beneficiaries. The board therefore is regarded
as responsible for maximizing the residual value of the firm remaining after
61
non-shareholder claimants are satisfied.
This easily translates to the twin
62
assertions that the goal of the corporation is to make money for its shareholders
and that the interests of shareholders are to be preferred over those of others
63
with interests in the firm. The resulting template for corporate law thus is
64
known as the “shareholder primacy” model.
b. The Progressives and Fellow Travelers
During the 1990s, a group of corporate law scholars launched an attack on
65
the neoclassical economic analysis just described. The attack focused on the
relationship between management and shareholders and quickly rejected the
66
notion of shareholder primacy. Corporate “progressives” generally endorse an
expansion of the goals of the corporation and the duties of management to

56. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, The Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 306-07 (1976) (discussing the corporation as a
nexus of principal-agent contracts); see also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 17 (1991) [hereinafter EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL,
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE] (discussing the corporate contract); Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, The
Contract Clause and the Corporation, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 767, 770 (1989) (characterizing the corporation
as a nexus of contracts).
57. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 56, at 7-8.
58. Id. at 17.
59. See id. at 4, 91.
60. Id. at 35-39.
61. See Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not So Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV.
1189, 1193 (2002) (discussing stockholders as residual claimants of the corporation).
62. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 56, at 35-39.
63. Id. at 90-94.
64. David Millon, New Game Plan or Business as Usual? A Critique of the Team Production Model of
Corporate Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1001, 1005-09 (2000) (discussing shareholder primacy and managerial
shirking).
65. David Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law: Foundations and Law Reform Strategies, in
PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 1, 16-22 (Lawrence Mitchell ed., 1995) [hereinafter Millon,
Communitarianism].
66. See generally Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 33; Jensen & Meckling, supra note 56, at 306 (arguing in support of
shareholder primacy); Millon, Communitarianism, supra note 65, at 9-11; Lyman Johnson, New
Approaches to Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1713, 1714 (1993) (contending the number of
people that view shareholder primacy as the default norm is decreasing).
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include responsibility to other constituents, frequently arguing for the
recognition of enforceable fiduciary duties running from directors to groups
68
such as creditors and employees. Progressives also have proposed methods of
69
increasing the board’s discretion to recognize non-shareholder interests by
extending the terms for which members of the board are elected and adopting
statutory safe harbors for situations where board members may consider the
70
interests of non-shareholder constituencies.
Two au courant schools of corporate analysis sometimes are identified with
71
the progressive movement. The first is the “team production” approach. The
72
second is “behavioral economics.” Both speak the language of neoclassical
economics and, although they divergently realign some of its basic assumptions,
they derive similar, “progressive” conclusions.
“Team production” scholars contend that the board of directors should be
understood as an independent “mediating hierarch” among the various
constituents of a corporation; in their view, the constituents are those with
73
“team specific” inputs. The board is charged both with employing the inputs
of financiers, workers, communities, etc., to maximize the value of the firm and
74
with allocating resulting profits fairly among the inputting groups. In this
model, the interests of shareholders are not to be preferred, except in somewhat
unremarkable procedural ways, such as the ability to elect directors and to bring
75
derivative actions on behalf of the corporation. The long-standing acceptance
of corporate philanthropy is invoked as evidence of the model’s descriptive
76
power.
The second recently popularized approach to corporate law is “behavioral
economics,” which uses empirical studies of human behavior to reassess and

67. See, e.g., Millon, Communitarianism, supra note 65, at 1; Wai Shun Wilson Leung, The
Inadequacy of Shareholder Primacy: A Proposed Corporate Regime That Recognizes Non-Shareholder
Interests, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 587 (1997).
68. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Fairness Rights of Corporate Bondholders, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165,
1178 (1990) (arguing that fiduciary rights should be extended to corporate bondholders); Marleen A.
O’Connor, Restructuring the Corporation’s Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect
Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189, 1235 (1991) (arguing that fiduciary duties should extend to
displaced workers) [hereinafter O’Connor, Displaced Workers].
69. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency
Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 581-82 (1992).
70. LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA’S NEWEST EXPORT 97-118
(2001) [hereinafter MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY].
71. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV.
247 (1999). Note, however, that the adherents of this model specifically disavow identification as
“progressives.” Id. at 253-54.
72. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics to Show the Power and Efficiency of
Corporate Law as a Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581 (2002); Christine Jolls, et al., A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998).
73. Blair & Stout, supra note 71, at 250.
74. Id. at 250-51.
75. Id. at 313-15.
76. See Margaret M. Blair, A Contractarian Defense of Corporate Philanthropy, 28 STETSON L. REV. 27
(1998) (defending director’s contributions to corporate charities through the team production
model).
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For
revamp some of the assumptions of neoclassical economic analysis.
purposes of this article, some of the most important insights of this method
involve the role of altruism in economic behavior. Numerous studies document
that human beings do act in a manner that is moderately altruistic rather than
78
classically self-interested.
This means that the outcomes hypothetically
bargained for by those involved in the behavioral economist’s corporate nexus
of contracts could be quite different from those hypothetically achieved as a
matter of neoclassical economic analysis. Notably, shareholders might prefer
that directors should have discretion to compromise the strict financial interests
79
of the shareholders. One might hope that this would be the case in situations
where shareholders are aware that corporations are exploiting children’s
vulnerability as consumers.
C. Who’s Watching the Children?: An Analysis of the Consequences and Cause
of Child-Driven Markets
The consequences to children of corporate decision-making can be
illustrated in a variety of ways, from anecdotes that reveal the impact on
individual children, to statistical evidence that demonstrates the effects on
children as a group. Although the following somewhat subverts the usual
ordering by placing consequence before logical proof of cause, it does so for a
reason: the effects of corporate stimulation of, and pandering to, the tastes of
underage consumers are life-shaping and sometimes life-threatening. Only if
the reader sees the devastating effects of the problem will he or she be truly
open to an investigation of what its causes are.
1. Children’s Stories
The West Paducah Shooter
On a dismal day in the recent past, a fourteen-year-old boy entered his high
80
school and opened fire. Although the boy had never before shot a handgun,
his marksmanship was uncanny: eight shots fired in three seconds hit eight
people in either the head or the torso. Experts later expressed the opinion that
the only way to account for his proficiency was his hours of experience playing
81
violent video games.

77. Greenfield, supra note 72, at 588 (“[Behavioral law and economics] insights may prove to
weaken conventional corporate law theory sufficiently so that much of it will have to be
reconsidered and replaced.”); see e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of
Corporate Compliance with the Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71 (2002); Donald C. Langevoort, Taming
the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV.
135 (2002).
78. Greenfield, supra note 72, at 628.
79. Cf. id. at 633-40 (discussing significance of behavioral incentives to share and cooperate for
the conduct of directors, without addressing shareholder preference).
80. See Campbell, School Shooters, supra note 50, at 813-15.
81. See generally Bobby Ross, Jr., Violence: Who’s to Blame? Society Looks at the Media,
Entertainment Sources, SUNDAY OKLAHOMAN, Dec. 26, 1999; cf. Bonnie B. Phillips, Virtual Violence or
Virtual Apprenticeship: Justification for the Recognition of a Violent Video Game Exception to the Scope of
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The Big Mac Attack
Ashley Pelman was fourteen years old, 4’10” tall, and weighed 170 pounds.
82
Jazlyn Bradly was nineteen, 5’6”, and 270 pounds. These two morbidly obese
teenagers brought suit against McDonald’s Corporation, making various claims
about the promotion and manufacture of McDonald’s products. Among other
things, they alleged that they had been misled about the nutritional value of the
McDonald’s products they had consumed. Their law suit, described as
“quixotic,” was dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be
83
granted. Their lack of a legal claim, however, did not make the teenagers any
healthier, happier, or lighter.
The Bling-Bling King
My son lives in one of the wealthiest counties in America. He watches
almost no television. His base school has very few minorities. Two things are
matters of gospel to him. He is convinced that he must speak fluent “ghetto” to
be popular with his peers, and he is POSITIVE that he must own every video
gaming device and game owned by any of his circle of friends. He nags,
wheedles, cajoles, does “mega-beg” (involving actual prostration), makes
promises about grades and chores, and, more often than I like to admit, gets his
way. He owns several games rated “T” for “teen”; moreover, he admits to
sometimes watching his friends play games rated “M.” This is the young videogamers’ equivalent of smoking without inhaling.
The Point
The point of these anecdotes, once again, is not very subtle. Commerce has
invaded and shaped the lives of children. Examples abound, both close to home
and further afield.
2. Another Numbers Story
Whoever it is who may be charged with the day-to-day monitoring of
individual children’s physical needs, it is clear that children as a group are being
very closely watched by corporate America - and for very good reasons. First,
children comprise a gigantic market. Second, they are highly susceptible to
suggestion and manipulation. Both of these assertions are documented below;
other interesting facts are thrown in for good measure.
Fact: Children between the ages of four and twelve engage in over $24 billion of
84
direct consumer purchasing each year. Their preferences are said to affect an

First Amendment Rights of Minors, 36 IND. L. REV. 1385 (2003) (generally discussing relationship of
video gaming and violence).
82. Benjamin Weiser, Big Macs Can Make You Fat? No Kidding, a Judge Rules, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23,
2003, at B3.
83. Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 517-18, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). For a more
thorough discussion, see McCann, supra note 46, at 1163 (using the “quixotic” characterization).
84. See James U. McNeal, Tapping the Three Kids’ Markets, AMERICAN DEMOGRAPHICS, Apr. 1998,
at 36.
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additional $300 billion of annual consumer transactions. When the influence of
older children also is taken into account, the purchasing power of the childish
86
market truly is monstrous.
Fact: Children are more trusting than adults, and they tend to view
87
advertisements as advice from a friend. Children under five generally cannot
distinguish between commercials and programming (including news
88
programming); children under eight generally cannot understand that
89
commercials are designed to persuade them to make purchases.
Fact: The average child views more than forty thousand commercials a year.

90

Fact: Children are more prone to take risks and value short-term over long-term
91
consequences than any other age group.
92

Fact: Fifty percent of children have televisions in their bedrooms.

Fact: Children spend, on average, twenty-eight hours a week watching
93
television; “mass-mediated story tellers reach them on the average of more
94
than seven hours a day . . . .”
Fact: Television viewing, video gaming, and computer gaming are correlated
95
with weight gain.
Fact: Experts believe that television viewing is a prime explanation for
96
increasing attention deficit disorders and has a negative correlation with school
97
performance.
98

Fact: Advertisers attempt to establish brand loyalty in young children.

85. See Hymel, supra note 22, at 405.
86. One 1992 study estimated 1992 spending by teenagers at $93 billion. Id.
87. Campbell, Ads2Kids, supra note 52, at 320 (citing Petition of Action for Children’s Television
for Rulemaking, Children’s Television Report and Policy Statement, 50 FCC 2d 1, 11, 16 (1974) aff ‘d,
Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (1974 Policy Statement)).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See Woodhouse, supra note 18, at 102.
91. See Barbara A. Atwood, The Child’s Voice in Custody Litigation: An Empirical Survey and
Suggestions for Reform, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 629, 657 (2003).
92. Woodhouse, supra note 18, at 106.
93. AM. MED. ASS’N, PHYSICIAN GUIDE TO MEDIA VIOLENCE 8 (1996), available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/386/mediaviolence.pdf.
94. ROY F. FOX, HARVESTING MINDS: HOW TV COMMERCIALS CONTROL KIDS, at xii (1996).
95. Cara B. Ebbeling et al., Childhood Obesity: Public-Health Crisis, Common Sense Cure, 360
LANCET 473, 475 (2002), available at http://www.commercialalert.org/childhoodobesity.pdf; Steven
L. Gortmaker et al., Television Viewing as a Cause of Increasing Obesity Among Children in the United
States, 1986-1990, 150 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 356 (1996).
96. Dimitri A Christakis et al., Early Television Exposure and Subsequent Attentional Problems in
Children, 113 PEDIATRICS 708, 710 (2004).
97. Woodhouse, supra note 18, at 107.

09_GABALDON.DOC

220 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

4/28/2006 8:57 AM

Volume 13:203

2006

Fact: Fast food companies dedicate most of their promotional budgets to
99
targeting children.
100

Fact: Advertisers spend more than $24 billion a year on youth marketing.

Fact: Experts believe that playing video games involves “stimulus addiction,”
leading players to crave increasing levels of stimulation, which can be satisfied
101
through increasing violence.
Fact: Experts believe that violent video games increase short and long-term
102
aggressive tendencies.

3. Rhetoric and Definitions
The billions spent by children spring directly from the seeds of the billions
invested in advertising to the youth market. Some of the statistics recited above
have been referred to by others as children’s “purchasing power.” It is the
contention of this article that children’s “purchasing power” is an oxymoron.
Doing as one is told, whether by Mommy, Daddy, Joe Cool, or Michael Jordan,
is not exercising a form of power. Doing the telling, if one is not consciously
103
attempting to act in the best interest of the child, is a form of exploitation.
This article uses the term “children’s manipulable preferences” to describe
those desires of children that are subject to commercial exploitation—that is
subject to stimulation by profit-seeking manipulation, whether by
advertisement, endorsement, deliberate addiction, or whatever.
Thus,
advertising sugary breakfast cereal on television shows watched by children is
an attempt to exploit children’s manipulable preferences. Paying a sports figure
to wear clothing of a type marketed to children is an attempt to exploit
children’s manipulable preferences. Deliberately increasing the violence of
video games marketed to children to stimulate the appetites jaded by the last
escalation is an attempt to exploit children’s manipulable preferences. Imprecise
and impressionistic as the basic concept may be for purposes of discussion, it
may be honed for purposes of action. Further discussion will occur in Part III;
honing for purposes of action will be one of the tasks of Part IV.

98.

See, e.g., MARION NESTLE, FOOD POLITICS: HOW THE FOOD INDUSTRY INFLUENCES NUTRITION
25 (2002); Jane E. Brody, Schools Teach 3 C’s: Candy, Cookies, and Chips, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
24, 2002, at F7.
99. Marlene Arnold Nicholson, McLibel: A Case Study in British Defamation Law, 18 WIS. INT’L L.J.
1, 139 (2000).
100. Woodhouse, supra note 18, at 102.
101. See Campbell, School Shooters, supra note 50, at 819-22.
102. See Craig A. Anderson & Karen E. Dill, Video Games and Aggressive Thoughts, Feelings, and
Behavior in Laboratory and in Life, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 772, 778 (2000): Kaveri
Subrahmanyan et al., New Forms of Electronic Media: The Impact of Interactive Games and the Internet on
Cognition, Socialization, and Behavior, in HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN AND THE MEDIA 73 (Dorothy G.
Singer & Jerome L. Singer eds., 2001); but see Chasing the Dream, supra note 10 (contending that there
is no long-term effect).
103. Cf. Hymel, supra note 22, at 409 (describing research on methods of manipulation).
AND HEALTH
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Joe here:
To reiterate, gentlemen and lady: Your job, which is to make money for
shareholders, dovetails perfectly with the vital American need to give
children something to spend their money on, as well as a tangible way for
American parents to express their love. After all, how else are they going
to have time to do it?
III. A + B = C
Section II provided background on the three phenomena discussed in the
Introduction: first, that there has been a change in the position of women in
society since the middle of the last century; second, that the widely accepted
goal of the corporation is to make money for its shareholders; and third, that
children buy or influence the buying of a tremendous amount of stuff, some of
which is not particularly good for them. Without a doubt, these phenomena are
temporally linked. It remains to this Section to establish that some other
relationship may exist, that the relationship is a problematic one, and that it is
particularly problematic for women.
A. Corporate Law: Problem? What Problem?
1. Contractarians
104
Contractarians generally have tended to deal in abstractions, and,
presumably, if asked (or, more likely, forced), would address the three
phenomena discussed above in the following manner: if women’s personal
utility is maximized by entering the paying work force, they will do so. If the
availability of more workers creates an excess supply, wages will decline until
equilibrium is reached. If rational workers do not exit the workforce, it means
there is no excess supply. Thus, the workers are being utilized. Because more
workers now are being utilized than ever before, it means that the economy is
waving its big invisible hand to produce more goods and services, which are
being consumed by persons rationally valuing them in amounts sufficient to
justify worker utilization. A linkage between women in the workplace, an
increase in production, and an increase in consumer demand thus is logical. The
source of the demand cannot be problematic, owing to the assumptions of the
method. The role of corporate management simply is to identify demands and
utilize workers to fulfill those demands in such a way as to maximize the return
to those who contribute non-human capital to the process.
Contractarians do acknowledge the existence of certain externalities, like
pollution, and other market imperfections that they believe should be addressed
105
by laws external to the corporation.
Presumably, if they became convinced
that irrational consumption choices were being made, it would be a matter for
external law to resolve. From a realistic standpoint (and as further discussed in
Part IV) this is unlikely to occur. Passing laws on ratings and censoring and

104. See supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text; Gabaldon, Lemonade Stand, supra note 17, at
1402-13.
105. See Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1271 (1982).
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limiting advertising to children simply has not been very successful. Among
other things, attempts generally have foundered on the shoals of arguments
107
about what parents themselves can and should do on behalf of their children,
108
and then there’s always that troublesome First Amendment. Moreover, since
the market provided by children’s manipulable preferences is so vast,
corporations have strong incentives both to oppose regulations of this sort and
to seek to subvert them.
2. Progressives and Fellow Travelers
Your garden variety corporate progressive is a person of liberal good will,
109
who more-or-less normatively endorses the notion of corporate responsibility.
Some progressives have already suggested that corporations should attend to
the needs of children as the nation’s future human capital. The proposed
110
methods of doing so involve parental work weeks, flex-time, and the like.
Corporate progressives have not yet focused specifically on exploitation of
children’s manipulable preferences or its possible link to shareholder primacy,
but the odds are good that they one day will endorse of the concern expressed in
this article. The mechanism for addressing that concern might well take the
form of enhanced directorial discretion to look beyond shareholder interest and,
111
by extension, to look beyond the bottom line.
However, due in part to the
general lack of diversity on America’s boards of directors, this might be a
112
solution that is less than ideal.
Team production scholars focus on the relationship between the board and
113
those with “team specific” inputs. Because consumers’ cash or credit are not
specifically dedicated to a particular corporation, they would not typically be
114
seen as part of the team whose interests are mediated by the board.
An
argument that the interests of children whose preferences are subject to
exploitation have no real choice as to where their inputs are directed might,
106. See Lee J. Munger, Comment, Is Ronald McDonald the Next Joe Camel? Regulating Fast Food
Advertisements Targeting Children in Light of the American Overweight and Obesity Campaign, 3 CONN.
PUB. INT. L.J. 456, 475-76 (2004), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1016&context=uconn/cpilj; Woodhouse, supra note 18, at 86-88; see also Beales, supra note 44
(discussing subject generally).
107. See, e.g., Beales, supra note 44, at 880 (“The proposal, in reality, is designed to protect
children from the weaknesses of their parents—and the parents from the wailing insistence of their
children.” (quoting Editorial, The FTC as National Nanny, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 1978, at A22 (describing
Federal Trade Commission rulemaking, later negated by Congress, limiting advertising to
children))); Woodhouse, supra note 18, at 86-88.
108. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (finding the Communications Decency Act of
1996 an unconstitutional infringement of adults’ First Amendment rights, notwithstanding
compelling state interest in protecting children); see also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S.
489 (1996) (holding that truthful, non-deceptive commercial advertising is protected by First
Amendment). For a general discussion of First Amendment considerations in this context, see
Beales, supra note 44, at 883-88.
109. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
110. See generally O’Connor-Felman, Human Capital, supra note 18 (detailing proposals).
111. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
112. See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 71-81 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
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however, make some headway. Moreover, since team production scholars point
to corporate philanthropy as one of the achievements of boards operating
pursuant to the model, they presumably would believe avoidance of
exploitation to be a type of philanthropy appropriately within the board’s
discretion.
Behavioral economics, of course, attempts to examine economic functioning
115
in light of real-life human nature. Although the approach does not appear to
have contemplated the problem of exploitation of children’s manipulable
preferences, there seems to be no reason its adherents would be reluctant to do
so, and it certainly does have the tools ready to hand. Examining the
motivations and biases of those many, parents included, who willingly lend
themselves to the exploitive process—perhaps even while privately regretting
the results—might be quite a fruitful endeavor.
B. Feminism and Corporate Law
116

There have been few applications of feminist analysis to corporate law,
although feminist descriptions of the effects of capitalism and neoclassical
117
economics are voluminous. In recognizing the relevance of feminist analysis
to corporate law, the critical first step is to remind ourselves of the various
guises of inequality. Although few overtly discriminatory laws can be identified
in the field of corporate law, inequalities inhere in its gendered creation and
118
application.
Some feminist explorations of corporate law have reflected an effort to
119
identify and apply a set of values based on women’s shared experiences.
These values are often said to include compassion and caring, both of which
120
may or may not be the product of centuries of oppression.
Some feminists
nonetheless accept these values as intuitively comfortable and, more
121
importantly, potentially beneficial to society.
The analytic process chosen to

115. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
116. See Kellye Y. Testy, Case Studies in Conservative and Progressive Legal Orders: Capitalism and
Freedom. For Whom? Feminist Legal Theory and Progressive Corporate Law, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
87 (2004) (generally calling for an increase); Gabaldon, Lemonade Stand, supra note 17, at 1413-14
(describing scarcity of applications of feminism in corporate law in early 1990s).
117. See, e.g., CAPITALIST PATRIARCHY AND THE CASE FOR SOCIALIST FEMINISM (Zillah Eisenstein
ed., 1979); MARILYN WARING, IF WOMEN COUNTED: NEW FEMINIST ECONOMICS (1988).
118. Gabaldon, Lemonade Stand, supra note 17, at 1389.
119. Marion G. Crain, Feminizing Unions: Challenging the Gendered Structure of Wage Labor, 89
MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1186-87 (1991) (explaining relational feminism); Robin West, Jurisprudence and
Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 13-42 (1988) [hereinafter West, Jurisprudence and Gender] (also addressing
relational feminism).
120. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, A Lawyer’s Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 1516 (1988);West, Jurisprudence and Gender, supra note 119, at 20-28; see also NANCY CHODOROW, THE
REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER (1978); but see, e.g.,
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies and Legal Education, or “The RemCrits Go to Law School,” 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 61, 72 nn.54-76 (1988); Joan W. Scott, Deconstructing
Equality-versus-Difference: Or, the Uses of Poststructuralist Theory for Feminism, 14 FEMINIST STUD. 33
(1988).
121. See CHODOROW, supra note 120; CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982); NEL
NODDINGS, CARING: A FEMINIST APPROACH TO ETHICS AND MORAL EDUCATION (1984).
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122

requires, of course, the grounding in women’s
effectuate these values
123
experience central to feminist method in general.
This grounding demands
124
examination of the actual context in which particular issues are presented.
Contextualization is deemed vital both because it arouses empathy and because
it reveals situational differences that can and should be dealt with by case125
specific accommodations. Rules that are either manufactured or applied in the
abstract, therefore, are regarded as likely to be somewhere between merely
126
unreliable and outright oppressive.
1. A Feminist View of Shareholder Primacy and Limited Liability
According to corporate law’s official story, it is designed to facilitate capital
agglomeration by efficiently substituting management by the board of directors
127
for the individual involvement of shareholders.
In order to convince
shareholders to relinquish control over the use of their capital they are offered
128
both limited liability and a system in which the managers legally are charged
with preferring shareholder interests.
The feminist fly in the ointment, however, is that this model of corporate
law is about permitting shareholders to benefit from risks imposed on others,
and about artificially distancing individuals from the real-life effects of the
enterprises in which they invest, thus decreasing their sense of personal
responsibility. It is a world in which shareholders need never be actively
involved in the actions of the businesses operated for their ostensible benefit. In
the case of exploitation of children’s manipulable preferences, it is a world in
which a group of grown-ups legally is prevented from assuming adult
responsibility for prospective harms inflicted on children.
Increasing involvement in corporate decision-making by institutional
investors or increasing availability of socially conscious investment alternatives
129
does not provide an answer to the problem.
In fact, increasing interest by
institutional investors has arguably contributed to enhancing the emphasis that

122. Many of these methods have been developed by or in conjunction with other feminist
approaches. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Smith, Women’s Perspective as a Radical Critique of Sociology, in
FEMINISM AND METHODOLOGY (Sandra Harding ed., 1987).
123. See Crain, supra note 119, at 1186-87.
124. See, e.g., Bender, supra note 120, at 10-11; Mari J. Matsuda, Liberal Jurisprudence and Abstracted
Visions of Human Nature: A Feminist Critique of Rawls’ Theory of Justice, 16 N.M. L. REV. 613 (1986); Ann
C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373 (1986).
125. Gabaldon, Feminism, Fairness and Fiduciary Duty, supra note 40, at 1.
126. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 849 (1990)
(discussing recognition of oppression).
127. See supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
128. For more general discussions of limited liability, see Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89 (1985) [hereinafter Easterbrook &
Fischel, Limited Liability]; Gabaldon, Lemonade Stand, supra note 17; Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability
and Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. L. REV. 80 (1991) [hereinafter Ribstein, Limited Liability].
129. See David Monsma & John Buckley, Non-Financial Corporate Performance: The Material Edges
of Social and Environmental Disclosure, 11 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 151, 190 (2004) (quantifying portfolios
screened for purposes of social responsibility investment as in excess of $2.15 trillion); Cynthia A.
Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV.
1197, 1287 (1999) (describing “dramatic” increase).
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130

Moreover,
corporate management places on short-term shareholder value.
although the availability of socially conscious investment funds at first glance
seems to be an unmitigated good, it also may constitute just enough in the way
of a pressure valve to keep more wide-spread change from occurring. In any
event, the proof is in the pudding. At the same time these trends have
manifested themselves, exploitation of children’s manipulable preferences has
increased. This temporal coincidence does not demonstrate cause and effect, but
it surely establishes that institutional investors are not meaningfully addressing
the welfare of children as consumers.
2. A Feminist View of “Internal Affairs”
Corporate law is, more or less by definition, a way of regulating the
131
“internal affairs” of the corporate entity
by adjusting the interests of
132
historically identified corporate constituencies. This paradigm is limited with
respect to its ability to determine inside interests other than the common
denominator of profit maximization. Moreover, since corporate law focuses on
“internal affairs,” any attempt to integrate the interests of outsiders seems
133
uncomfortably retrofit.
Feminists seeking either a broader definition of
cognizable shareholder concerns or attention to non-shareholder interests will
find the entire concept of internal affairs unduly constraining.
While the emphasis that corporate law places on “internal affairs” may
suggest that the a feminist solution to the problem of exploitation of children’s
manipulable preferences must be a matter of external law—that is, a matter of
regulation imposed on advertising and other activities—there also exists another
possibility. The corporate law paradigm may be tweaked either by invoking the
meaningful expression of shareholder interest on specific matters involving
children’s manipulable preferences or by redefining the concept of permissible
corporate profitability. Both of these methods are further addressed in Part IV.
C. A Practical Analysis
Toward the end of the twentieth century, issuers and thoughtful observers
realized that, perverse as it might seem, stock price sometimes could be
maximized by engaging in businesses without a proven track record and
without a link to past earnings—in other words, without a predictable income
134
stream. This strategy avoided placing a limit on the upside potential of stock

130. Robert W. Hamilton, Corporate Governance in America 1950-2000: Major Changes But Uncertain
Benefits, 25 J. CORP. L. 349 (2000); cf. Franklin A. Gevurtz, Getting Real about Corporate Social
Responsibility: A Reply to Professor Greenfield, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 645 (2002) (analyzing trends).
131. See, e.g., Note, The Internal Affairs Doctrine: Theoretical Justifications and Tentative Explanations
for Its Continued Primacy, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1480, 1480 (2002).
132. For a general discussion, see William J. Carney, Does Defining Constituencies Matter?, 59 U.
CIN. L. REV. 385 (1990) (discussing historic identification and matters related to corporate
constituencies).
133. See, e.g., id.; MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY, supra note 70, at 104-105.
134. For a general discussion of irrational stock pricing during the late twentieth century, see
ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2002). For a discussion of the possibility of regulating
such pricing, see Theresa A. Gabaldon, John Law, with a Tulip, in the South Seas: Gambling and the
Regulation of Euphoric Market Transactions, 26 J. CORP. L. 225 (2001).
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price, thus permitting a form of stock speculation that would have been
completely unjustifiable had projected earnings been expected to have linear
continuity with those of the past. These businesses tended to be novel, to
involve rapid product innovation or to be reliant on irrational consumer
preferences.
Computer hardware, software, game-ware, and other
entertainment devices fit the bill perfectly, as did availability of internet services.
In order to stay unpredictable, rapid development of services and products—
and thus rapid obsolescence of older products—became a necessity. As a result,
a great deal of change occurred in the identified areas of opportunity—areas, not
incidentally, in which a great deal of consumption was driven by children’s
manipulable preferences.
The migration of women into the workplace and the collapse of that brief
135
but idealized interlude of separate spheres and protected childhood coincided
with, and very arguably accelerated, the dramatic technological advances
described above.
These technological advances permitted the rapid
development of new products, as well as the proliferation of ways to market
them, but did not give rise to any realistic way for parents to control their
136
consumption by children.
As a result, women have, through workplace
participation, contributed to the problem of exploitation of children’s
manipulable preferences. At home, however, the power of women, like that of
men, to address the issue is severely limited.
One hazards a guess—in fact, one knows from common sense as well as
from studies (with numbers and everything)—that many of the objects of
children’s manipulable preferences are not what parents, left to their own
137
devices, would choose for their children.
At the same time, they are not
objects that parents realistically can deny. First, parents who are often less
interested in video games and less technically adept than their offspring, may
not fully comprehend the attributes of the merchandise in question are. Second,
they do not feel they have time or energy to seek alternatives. Third, they may
138
feel trapped by the problem of the commons, reasoning that, if they invest in
rigorous monitoring of their own children’s consumption, but others do not, the
139
“spill-over” effects on the monitored children are unavoidable. The only thing
140
that may be achieved in the process is intense parent-child hostility, feelings of
141
parental failure, and perhaps some genuine social adjustment issues for the

135. See generally supra notes 17-86.
136. See Campbell, Ads2Kids, supra note 52, at 340 (describing the futility of screening devices).
137. See Hymel, supra note 22, at 388.
138. The “tragedy of the commons” problem arises when the benefits of an activity do not accrue
solely to the actor. See, e.g., Paul A. Samuelson, Pitfalls in the Analysis of Public Goods, 10 J.L. & ECON.
199 (1967).
139. See Woodhouse, supra note 18, at 106 (noting that “to control the relentless flow of media
influences, a parent would have to remove the child from peer influences and from mainstream
social institutions”).
140. See Hymel, supra note 22, at 411 (describing “undermining” of authority); Munger, supra
note 106, at 478-479 (describing parent-child transactions and referring to “assaults on parental
authority”).
141. See Hymel, supra note 22, at 389 (describing psychic effects on low income families).
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child who feels “different” from his friends. Finally, parents may be driven by
their guilt over self-perceived neglect of their children to make purchases to
143
substitute for attention.
D. Exploitation of Children’s Manipulable Preferences: A Gendered Issue
Feminist analysis decodes gendered corporate law’s shareholder-preferring
but disempowering norms. It recognizes that permitting the investment of
resources with limited liability for their use is a form of moral hazard—an
abdication of responsibility. It also willingly exposes corporate law’s formal, but
flawed, underlying assumptions about rationality in the marketplace. When
experience is invoked, it becomes perfectly clear that assuming parental
supervision of children’s purchases is very much like, the old joke about a can
144
opener. Feminist invocation of experience tells us of harried women working
“second shifts” at home. It also describes observations of children gaining
weight, and of children clamoring for, and being obsessed with, technology, sex,
and violence. It does not prove a “but-for” connection, but it tells us how we
feel. Irrational or not, we feel guilty. It is not unrealistic to suspect that those
who feel guiltiest may be more easily mobilized than those whose pangs are less
intense.
Thus, there are several reasons why exploitation of children’s manipulable
preferences may fairly be regarded as a gendered issue. First, it may be the
consequence of a male—constructed corporate law. Second, exploitation of
children’s manipulable preferences may be a particular problem for women
because we have developed the analytic tools to identify it. Third, and most
obviously, it is a particular problem for women because society has convinced
us to feel that it is.
And Now, More from Joe:
Gentlemen and Lady, there’s just a little more to cover. There are
people out there who want to mess up this sweet little deal. They’re
suggesting ways to interfere with our ability to give kids the things we want
them to want. Here are some things to watch out for. (But don’t worry too
much just yet.)

142. Id. at 410.
143. See generally Allison Pugh, From Compensation to Childhood Wonder: Why Parents Buy (Ctr. for
Working Families, Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, Working Paper No. 39, 2002), available at
http://wfnetwork.bc.edu/berkeley/papers/39.pdf (discussing parental motivations); Allison Pugh,
When is a Doll More than a Doll? Selling Toys as Reassurance for Maternal and Class Anxiety (Ctr. for
Working Families, Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, Working Paper No. 28, 2001), available at
http://wfnetwork.bc.edu/berkeley/papers/28.pdf (also discussing parental motivations).
144. A short-form version of the joke goes something like this. Three men are stranded on a
desert island: a lawyer, an accountant, and an economist. The only food they have among them is a
can of tuna fish. The lawyer and accountant exhaust themselves looking for rocks or coconuts with
which to pound the can open. The economist watches, laughing. In frustration, the lawyer shouts,
“Okay, if you’re so smart, you open it.” The economist smugly says, “It’s simple. First, you assume
a can opener.”
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IV. SOLUTIONS
This article is not meant to suggest that women can or should return to the
exclusive bosoms of their families. The realizations set forth do mean, however,
that anyone willing to be informed by feminist method and experience can and
should take heed of the phenomenon of children’s manipulable preferences, and
act to solve the problem as best they can. As stated above, confronting the
problem at home, where childcare largely has been relegated as traditional
women’s work, is not the best that can be done. Individual fingers in a
collective dike comprise a plausible strategy only if the dike has not already
been breached. The situation is too far gone, and the beast must be confronted
where it lives.
A. The Best Shot
The beast lives in corporate profit. It could be fully contained only through
containing its profitability. If corporations simply were precluded from
profiting from the exploitation of children’s manipulable preferences, the world
of childhood soon would become a far different place—one with far less
electronic violence, far fewer celebrity-endorsed items of apparel, and no Happy
Meals. This proposal, however, presents several difficulties.
The first and largest difficulty, which simply must be ignored for purposes
145
of continued discussion, is political feasibility.
Those who have gained the
most from exploitation of children’s manipulable preferences would mobilize
quickly and throw so much money into lobbying and the like that the proposal
surely would die aborning. Exposure of the proposal to public view nonetheless
might have some useful effect on public opinion and might further discussion.
To have any significant effect, though, the proposal must be a coherent one,
and herein lies the second group of difficulties—those of articulation. How does
one rigorously define “children’s manipulable preferences,” “exploitation,” or
“profit”? Furthermore, how can profitability be limited? What penalty can
there be for breaching the proposed rule? Upon whom would such penalty be
imposed? Matters of definition will be discussed below before the issue of
general formulation is addressed.
Thus far, this article has used the term “children’s manipulable
preferences” simply to describe those preferences of children that are subject to
146
manipulation.
For purposes of action, the concept must be further refined.
First, “children” must be defined. Reference to age is both convenient and
usual, though inevitably both over- and under-inclusive. Let us say, however,
that a “child” is anyone under the age of eighteen. Articulating which
“preferences” are subject to manipulation is more of a challenge, unless one is
willing to make the concept a self-proving one: That is, if someone is trying to
manipulate a preference, let us assume that it is one that may be manipulated. If
no one is trying to engage in manipulation, there is, after all, no problem to be
addressed.
145. For a description of past lobbying efforts by, for example, the fast food industry, see
McCann, supra note 46, at 1195-96.
146. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.

09_GABALDON.DOC

4/28/2006 8:57 AM

JOE CAMEL

229

1. The Content of a Proposed Rule
An appropriate rule, then, might focus on preventing specific activities,
known either as “manipulation” or “exploitation” with respect to those under
the age of eighteen. Describing the verboten activities presents a genuine
challenge. How might we capture the full range of product adulterations (such
as nicotine and violence contents), celebrity endorsements, hypnotic and
suggestive advertisements, and the like (and unlike)? Although it indeed would
be difficult to provide an all-inclusive definition with enough clarity to be
enforceable in any sense, it would not be particularly difficult or unreasonable to
say that advertising directed to an audience composed largely of children is an
147
attempt to manipulate that audience.
Consider, for a moment, then, the consequences of a rule that prohibits all
advertising to children, but not the advertising to adults of children’s products.
The first and most obvious consequence is that children would be less likely to
be attracted to, and, indeed, less aware of certain products. The market for those
products presumably would decline, as would the availability and development
of products for that market. This is not, in truth, all that distressing. No one,
after all, is marketing life-saving drugs on Nickelodeon. Of course, if
advertising to children went away, so would Nickelodeon and, presumably, so
would a lot of other children’s programming. If elimination of advertising to
children led to overall decline in television viewing however, it more than
148
arguably would be a good thing.
What would not be such a good thing, however, is the possible loss of jobs
that could accompany the demise of Nickelodeon and other frivolous and even
arguably harmful children’s products. This is regrettable (easy to say, since it is
not law professorships we are talking about), and perhaps a dislocation better
suffered in stages. This suggests a sunset approach to advertising to children,
rather than anything like immediate prohibition.
Another possible approach would be to sunset the profitability of
transactions involving certain products sold largely to or for children. Consider,
next, a rule specifying that, over time, permitted profit levels on particular items
would ratchet downward. The items would include clothing, fast food, and
electronic entertainment devices marketed to children. Would such a rule mean
that children would be naked, hungry, and bored? Presumably, this would
depend on the profit level permitted.
2. The Format of a Proposed Rule
In any event, the dangers inherent in a rule directed either to prohibition of
advertising or profitability may have some informational value for the choice of
format. There are at least three ways in which any such rule generally might be
cast. First, the specified activity (be it advertising or profit-taking) might be

147. See BRIAN WILCOX ET AL., REPORT OF THE APA TASK FORCE ON ADVERTISING TO CHILDREN,
RECOMMENDATIONS 1-2 (2004), available at http://www.apa.org/pi/cyf/advertisingandchildren.pdf
(discussing the proposal of the American Psychological Association to ban advertising directed at
children under nine).
148. If, on the other hand, it led to viewing of adult programs, it would not be a good thing.
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criminalized. Second, the activity generally might be made ultra vires and thus
placed beyond the power of corporations. Third, specified acts might be made
to require the approval of the shareholders of the corporation.
a. From Without: Criminalization
Criminalization of specified conduct is a proposal for reform from
“outside” corporate law. It utilizes a format that is easily understood because of
its familiarity to the populace at large. Whenever corporate conduct is
criminalized, however, the issue of who is to be penalized presents itself.
Should the targets of prosecution be corporate entities or real people? In either
case, what showings should be made necessary with respect to state of mind?
Problems with vagueness and First Amendment issues also could take on
150
excruciating proportions. It seems, moreover, to be a very large hammer that
most legislators would be reluctant to swing, particularly in light of anticipated
opposition by interested parties. Based on past history in the context of
151
attempts to eliminate advertising to children, criminalization is the least
promising of the three approaches posited.
b. From Within
i. Ultra Vires
Another approach, this one from within corporate law’s standard
taxonomy, would be to make advertising or profiting from children’s
manipulable preference an ultra vires act, or one that is beyond the corporation’s
legal powers. This is an interesting thought experiment. Saying that an act is
beyond a corporation’s legal powers does not make the act impossible, however,
since the people animating the corporate structure are still quite capable of
engaging in it. This means that there would have to be mechanisms for
deterring those individuals—injunctions, monetary penalties or the like. Even if
these mechanisms operated imperfectly, the approach might have significant
symbolic value and do quite a bit to shape corporate behavior. It is, again,
however, a very large hammer that would be difficult to employ.
ii. Shareholder Approval
By contrast, requiring shareholder approval of certain acts seems almost
politically palatable, constitutionally superior (at least to the route of
criminalization), and eminently achievable. There are a variety of ways a
shareholder approval requirement might be cast. For instance, publicly-held
corporations could be required to prepare reports on products marketed to and
for children, detailing both advertising expenditures and providing general

149. For an overview of the ultra vires doctrine and its continuing utility, see Kent Greenfield,
Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality (with Notes on How Corporate Law Could
Reform International Law Norms), 87 VA. L. REV. 1279 (2001); see also Katie J. Thoennes, Comment,
Frankenstein Incorporated: The Rise of Corporate Power and Personhood in the United States, 28 HAMLINE
L. REV. 203 (2005) (providing historical overview).
150. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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product descriptions. These reports could be posted on the corporate web site.
Any shareholder wishing to call for a vote at the next annual meeting on any
practice or expenditure thus exposed and representing more than a defined de
minimis amount then could be entitled to do so. The vote of the shareholders
even could be made binding (rather than merely advisory).
From the standpoint of those concerned with exploitation issues, the
greatest benefit of such a requirement would be sensitizing shareholders (and
consequently board members) to the fact that the issue exists. Its most
significant effect might be to shed sunlight on child-driven markets. It also is
possible that if shareholders were specifically given the right to vote on, say, the
use of icons such as Joe Camel, they just might say “no.” Even institutional
investors generally pressing for improved profitability might incline toward
social responsibility if the sunlight is sufficiently intense.
B. Existing Tools
Although reform along the lines alluded to above may be a worthy goal,
many feminists willingly recognize that real life is not perfect, and that the
desire for more sweeping changes should not stand in the way of incremental
reform. The tools that are practicably accessible should not be ignored. These
include the conscientious attempt to consider the exploitation issue oneself and
the conscientious attempt to bring it to the attention of others. In considering
the utility of those implements, it is useful to contemplate their availability to
rank-and-file workers, members of management, and shareholders.
1. Workers
Contractarian literature essentially assumes that workers and the
153
corporations that employ them have equal bargaining power.
Progressive
154
literature emphatically diverges from this assumption; experience surely
suggests that the progressives are closer to the mark. Relative disempowerment,
however, is not complete disempowerment. Simple day-to-day mindfulness of,
and comment on, the issue of the exploitation of children’s manipulable
preferences may have some useful effect.
This is true notwithstanding the inevitability that some voices will be heard
more clearly than others. In this regard, it is interesting to note speculations that
women, who are accustomed to their role as workplace outsiders, generally are
more willing than men to act as whistle blowers and call attention within and

152. See Monsma & Buckley, supra note 129, at 200 (describing posting of reports on
environmental and social practices by Fortune 500 and other companies).
153. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Limited Liability, supra note 128, at 104 (characterizing
employees as “voluntary creditors” and stating that “[t]he compensation they demand will be a
function of the risks they face”). Even where the bargaining is labeled “quasi-voluntary” and is
conceded to be hypothetical, such bargaining is regarded as normatively desirable. See Ribstein,
Limited Liability, supra note 128, at 129-130; but see Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward
Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1079, 1120-21 (1991) (characterizing as
“involuntary” those creditors entering contracts without substantial awareness of relevant risks).
154. See generally O’Connor, Displaced Workers, supra note 68 (describing progressive worker
disempowerment).
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One can imagine that
without corporations to situations meriting redress.
women who are sensitized to the exploitation issue and who also feel
responsible for contributing to the problem through their personal and
professional behavior it might seek to cast beams of light on the subject.
2. Management
Managers, including for purposes of this discussion members of the board
of directors, generally are motivated by the mainstream mantra of maximizing
156
shareholder value.
As such, they presumably bear primary blame for the
exploitation of children’s manipulable preferences. It would be well for
managers to become sensitized to the issue, as well as to become more aware of
the discretion that management actually possesses to engage in actions that do
not maximize shareholder value. In this respect, the business judgment rule
157
confers common law leeway; corporate constituency statutes specifically
158
permitting the consideration of non-shareholder interests go even further.
Obviously, the real-life competitive pressures experienced by corporate
management thus far seem to have outweighed the theoretical utility of these
tools. It is possible that additional sensitization to the issue of exploitation
might have a useful effect, and it once again is interesting to speculate whether
women, whose roles in management are increasing, might do anything
159
differently than men. There is evidence suggesting that “token” women in
management are unlikely to effect meaningful reform, because they are likely to
assume, indeed are likely already to have assumed, the attitudes of the
160
majority. It is, in any event, indisputable that the high-achieving women who
make their way into management are much less likely to have children than
161
either their male peers or female rank-and-file. As a result, the context of their
lives might render them relatively more interested in issues other than those
presented by children’s manipulable preferences.

155. See, e.g., Judy B. Rosener, Why Are Women More Likely to Reveal Corporate Scandals?, PR
NEWSWIRE (U.S.), May 16, 2005; but see Paige Wiser, Can Women Keep Secrets? What if Woodward and
Bernstein Weren’t Men?, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 6, 2005, at 58 (referring to studies indicating that
women are not more likely to reveal secrets than men).
156. For a helpful discussion of the extralegal forces prompting corporate boards to observe a
shareholder primacy norm, see Gevurtz, supra note 130, at 651-53.
157. This is conceded even by contractarians. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE, supra note 56, at 93. See generally, Charles Hansen, Comment, The ALI Corporate
Governance Project: Of the Duty of Due Care and the Business Judgment Rule, 41 Bus. Law. 1237 (1986)
(describing various attempts to articulate the business judgment rule).
158. See MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY, supra note 70, at 104-05.
159. “Token” women are those chosen to achieve superficial, rather than meaningful, diversity
goals. See generally supra note 2.
160. For a discussion of the co-option process, see John M. Darley, How Organizations Socialize
Individuals into Evildoing, in CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS 13
(David M. Messick & Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1996).
161. See O’Connor-Felman, Human Capital, supra note 18, at 1349; SYLVIA ANN HEWLETT,
PROFESSIONAL WOMEN AND THE QUEST FOR CHILDREN (2002) (indicating that forty-nine percent of
women who earn $100,000 or more were still childless after age forty, and many regretted it).
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3. Shareholders
Shareholders do have choices about alternative investment vehicles; it is
arguable that they might be sensitized to “vote with their feet” against corporate
decisions that smell of exploitation. Individual shareholders, however, do not
have limitless time to investigate and act on their findings about corporate
behavior, especially since they may feel that their decision to withdraw their
investments will at best, have only a marginal impact on corporate decision
making. Despite this, we can invoke the homely aphorism that “every little bit
helps.” We also can note the slow but steady growth of social responsibility
162
funds, which one day might add the exploitation of children’s manipulable
preferences to the list of activities for which such funds screen.
There are, in addition, two other tools available to the relatively energetic
shareholder. The first of these is derivative litigation. This is litigation brought
by a shareholder on the corporation’s behalf, typically against members of
corporate management for actions taken in violation of their various fiduciary
163
duties. Skipping lightly over the demand and other procedural impediments
to bringing suits of this type brings us to the crux of difficulty. To avoid
frivolity, there must be a credible argument that actions exploiting children’s
manipulable preferences violate some duty to the corporation. It seems unlikely
that a court would hold that they do, given that the “quixotic” lawsuits brought
against corporations by obese consumers and grieving survivors of those killed
in rampages have thus far not succeeded. The latitude afforded management by
the business judgment rule is simply so broad that most management decisions
are unassailable.
A more promising tool is the possible use of shareholder proposals.
Although the shareholders of public corporations do not, in fact, have the power
to preclude corporate engagement in specific activities, exploitive or
164
otherwise, they do have the power to adopt “advisory” resolutions informing
165
management of their wishes. These resolutions arguably have a shaping effect
166
on corporate conduct.
Moreover, in recent years, changes in position by the
Securities and Exchange Commission have enhanced the practical ability of
shareholders to have motions relating to issues of social concern considered,

162. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
163. See generally Tom Oliver Brandi, The Strike Suit: A Common Problem of the Derivative Suit and
the Shareholder Class Action, 98 DICK. L. REV. 355, 387 (1999) (discussing derivative litigation); Theresa
A. Gabaldon, Free Riders and the Greedy Gadfly: Examining Aspects of Shareholder Litigation as an Exercise
in Integrating Ethical Regulation and Laws of General Applicability, 73 MINN. L. REV. 425, 433 (1988) (also
discussing derivative litigation).
164. See supra Part IV-A for a proposal which would grant shareholders the power to preclude
corporate engagement in specific activities.
165. For description of the shareholder proposal mechanism and its possible uses to improve
working conditions and thus the lives of workers’ children, see O’Connor-Felman, Human Capital,
supra note 18, at 1329-30, 1339-41; see also Kevin Healy & Jeffrey M. Tapick, Climate Change: It’s Not
Just a Policy Issue for Corporate Counsel - It’s a Legal Problem, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 89, 105-06 (2004)
(describing increasing use of shareholder proposals to address environmental issues); Monsma &
Buckley, supra note 129, at 190-91 (also describing increasing use of shareholder proposals to address
environmental issues).
166. See supra note 162; John M. Holcomb, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Related Legal Issues, and Global
Comparisons, 32 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 175, 177 (2004).
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notwithstanding their involvement in the ordinary business of the corporation.
With some attention to presentation, motions relating to the exploitation of
children presumably would fit the bill.

Joe’s conclusion:
In summary, gentlemen and lady, any corporate board that isn’t giving
children exactly what they want is missing the boat, and risking the high
dudgeon of its shareholders, none of whom seem to be noticing that the
company is producing things they might not want their own children to have.
(But you know what they say about consistency and hobgoblins!) In any
event, I know by this time I’m singing to the choir. Any questions?
V. CONCLUSION
Children have not been body-snatched from their parents, but they have
been mind-snatched. Saying that the women’s liberation movement and
corporate America are complicit is a nice turn of phrase, but far too
inflammatory and value-laden. Suffice it, instead, to say that the perfect storm
of parental time crunch, technological advances, increased workforce
participation, and corporate profit-seeking behavior have combined to put
artificially aroused and exaggerated desires of children behind the wheel of an
out-of-control marketplace which feeds back into those aroused and
exaggerated desires. Simply ignoring the problem will not make it go away.
This article takes the position that the issue of the exploitation of children’s
manipulable preferences must be raised and examined. As part of this process,
it is important to call on the experience of actual human beings and to recount
168
real stories.
Empathy must be generated and attention must be paid. It is
speculation to indicate that the empathy and attention of women might more
easily be attracted than that of men. Nonetheless, feminist method demands,
with respect to this issue as with respect to all issues, focus on the actual
experience of women in the workplace and at home.
Idealized portrayals of the life of children in earlier decades frequently
place those children in the context of warm and loving families, constantly
available to provide support in making the “right” decisions, in bringing up
children in the straight and true. Perhaps Darby and his friends did indeed
enjoy parental counterweight to the nascent advertising attempts to influence
their consumption. Perhaps not.
In any event, the mothers of America have gone to work. If not Darby’s,
then Michael Levy’s or the New Boy’s. If not your children’s, then my son’s.
Whether or not the precedent imagery was correct, it is indisputable that the
mothers who peopled that imagery have less time to spend in the home. It is
just as indisputable that they feel guilty about the amount of attention they are

167. See Thomas W. Joo, A Trip Through the Maze of “Corporate Democracy”: Shareholder Voice and
Management Composition, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 735 (2003) (discussing progress and impediments to
progress).
168. See Robert L. Palmer, When Law Fails: Ethics, Commerce, and Tales of Value, 2 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 245 (1993) (discussing social value of storytelling).
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able to give to their children. This may be part of the permanent human
condition, although one hopes that it is not. It is, nonetheless, a reason to be
concerned with, and to pay attention to, the exploitation of children’s
manipulable preferences.
Joe’s last word:
Next month, our topic will be “Children in Third-World Countries: Not
Yet Giving Their All.”

